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CASTING LIGHT ON CULTURAL PROPERTY
John J. Costonis*
PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES. By Joseph L. Sax. Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 245. $32.50.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Theorists of private property invite comparison to theorists of
light.
For centuries, the latter have debated whether light is best under
stood as a wave or as a photon. The rivalry has been intense because
each hypothesis explains some characteristics of light very well, but
others very poorly. Wave theory outstrips photon theory in explaining
such phenomena as light's frequencies and diffraction patterns. But
photon theory, which reduces light to a succession of particles, more
effectively explains such subatomic phenomena as changes in an
atom's orbital shell produced by the interaction of photons and elec
trons.
Property theorists too can be viewed as occupying different posi
tions on a spectrum. On one end are those supporting a conception of
property as a self-contained and bounded photon; on the other, those
favoring a model of property as a wave registering, indeed incorpo
rating, the tensions and values of the social ether through which the
wave moves.
A.

Property as Photon

The property-as-photon model undergirds United States Supreme
Court opinions labeling as "per se takings" public restrictions that li
cense a permanent physical occupation of private property or that de
prive the owner of its entire economic value. These opinions deem
irrelevant the public purposes underlying these restrictions - the so
cial "ether," if you will, within which they are intended to function.
Like a self-contained photon, private property stands separate and
apart from its claimed links to larger social purposes. Uncompensated
incursions upon it are deemed per se takings, no matter how compel
ling the governmental purpose or, in the case of permanent physical
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occupations, how marginal the encroachment.
These opinions,
moreover, tend to identify the "property" in question as much with
the physical entity itself (typically real estate) as with the relations the
physical entity bears to its owner and to the community beyond.
The two leading per se takings opinions illustrate these features.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Company,1 a permanent
physical occupation case, examined a New York statute that author
ized cable television companies to install 4"x 4"x 4" control boxes atop
New York City apartment buildings without securing their owners'
permission. The statute's purpose was to facilitate the diffusion of ca
ble TV's educational and social benefits by reducing viewer costs that
had been inflated by fees charged by building owners for the space
atop their roofs.2
Whether or not the public interest in increasing viewer access
should prevail over the owners' claim is certainly debatable. But the
Court's per se rule prevented the question from being raised at all.
Distressed that the cable companies' "property" (their cable boxes)
would be affixed, unconsented, to the building owner's "property"
(the space atop the building), the Court confined its analysis to an
evaluation of the character of the physical encroachment alone.3 Pre
dictably, it concluded that the statute's grant of uncompensated access
violated the Fifth Amendment's takings ban.4
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,5 a total economic depri
vation case, likewise focused on a public restriction's impact on private
property while proscribing inquiry into the consequences beyond a
landowner's lot lines of his exercise of dominion over his property. As
defined by the South Carolina legislature, the restriction sought,
among other purposes, to prevent coastal erosion by barring construc
tion within a prescribed distance from a shoreward line.6 To be effec
tive, such programs must address regulated areas as comprehensive
ecological networks - such as shorelines, basins, or estuaries - not as
discrete ownership parcels isolated from these networks.
The coastal plan, which placed Lucas's two lots in the non
buildable shoreward zone, was comprehensive. But it failed to pro
vide him with a financial offset for the total loss of development rights
that its comprehensiveness dictated. For the Court, the loss of these

1. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
2 See id. at 425.

3. See id. at 439, 441.
4. See id. at 441. The Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for pub
lic use, withoutjust compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. See id. at 1007-09.
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rights alone determined Lucas's outcome. Unless the restriction in
heres in the owner's title by virtue of the state's prior property or nui
sance principles, reasoned Justice Scalia in his majority opinion, the
statute's public purposes must be ignored in the takings calculus.7
This is property-as-photon theory with a double vengeance. It seg
regates individual private lots from their inclusion in larger ecological
units. It also dismisses from the takings calculus consideration of the
off-site community advantages these restrictions are designed to serve.
The photon model, like that of light, explains, or at least rational
izes, a variety of issues associated with its subject. One is the structure
of the Fifth Amendment's syntax that "private property [may not] be
taken for public use."8 The Amendment's independent treatment of
the terms "property" and "public use" arguably supports the view that
an owner's proprietary interest is not diminished by the "publicness"
of the property in question.9 On the contrary, the text could be read
to reflect that the more "public" the benefits conferred on the larger
community by the contested private property restrictions, the stronger
the claim that these restrictions require compensation as a matter of
constitutional right.10
The model also comports with the common understanding that
property implicates autonomy and personality values as well as eco
nomic values. Autonomy fits hand in glove with the conception of
property as a barrier against, not as an opening for, state curtailment
of the owner's dominion. As William Pitt declared long ago:
[t]he poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storm may enter it; but the King of England cannot enter it! All his
power dares not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!11
The property-as-photon model is further distinguished by its roots
in, and congruence with, the preference of America's mixed economic
system for private ordering absent evident market failure or injury to
others stemming from proprietor primacy. This preference derives
from a wariness of public regulations imposed in the name of commu
nitarian values. Its adherents, which include many of the last quarter
century's law and economics and public choice scholars, believe that
the private marketplace is typically the most efficient resource alloca
tor and that private ordering best safeguards individual freedom by

7. See id. at 1027-28.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
9. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
10. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993).
11. CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, SELECT BRITISH ELOQUENCE 65 (1870).
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linking property and personality.12 Some even believe they have the
mathematical equations to prove these contentions.
Paralleling the communitarians' fear of market failure, is the pho
ton theorists' obsession with government failure. Their reasoning is
familiar. Government may regulate inefficiently or inequitably due to
insufficient information, excessive administrative costs, or simply, in
ept management. Values masquerading as communitarian are often
those of private factions more astute at manipulating the political pro
cess than are their adversaries or an indifferent or acquiescent public
in whose name these values are asserted.
Photon model adherents also question legislators' capacity to an
ticipate or describe the activities a particular measure seeks to regu
late with sufficient precision to achieve the purposes at hand or to
cabin the risks associated with the strategic behavior of factions or, for
that matter, of governmental officials themselves. They believe that
dangers of such governmental failure outweigh the risk that a private
ordering system may overlook goals valued by elites or, perhaps, by
many others in the community.
The property-as-photon model reinforces the private ordering
preference in multiple ways. It warns that public regulation that too
easily dismisses the preference may fail in a system in which the insti
tution of property remains solidly linked to private initiative despite
government's increasing role as a creator and regulator of wealth. The
private sector may eschew or obscure from governmental attention the
creation, ownership, preservation or donation of property valued by
the public if government shifts to itself the owner's proprietary enti
tlements. The model, which is premised on the wide diffusion of
property and property owners throughout the private sector, also ex
plains why high administrative and enforcement costs inevitably ac
company governmental efforts to regulate property or its owners.13
The model also rationalizes a legal regime that invests presumptive
dominion over property with its private owner, and allows this pre
sumption to be overridden only if government can justify the regula
tion under its police or eminent domain powers. The presumption
favors the economic interest of individual property owners, of course.
No less important to adherents of private ordering, it also hinders the
imposition of these controls by requiring government to generate po
litical support for the exercise of either power and, in the case of the
eminent domain power, to drain the public treasury as well.

12 See W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence ofProperty Rights as the Foremost Principle
of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1980, at 66 (discussing the revival of legal interest in how property protects non
economic values).
13. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Compensation for Takings: An Eco
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
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Property as Wave

Property's wave theorists portray the bounds of proprietary enti
tlement as dependent in any given context upon the clash of pertinent
social and proprietor interests.14 Theirs is a secular, not a sacred, con
ception of property rights, which they are more inclined to view as ex
pectations subject to diminution by superceding public interests. Illus
trative of this viewpoint, and worthy of contrast with the United States
Constitution's Fifth Amendment, is Article 42(2) of the Italian Consti
tution, which, under the title of "Property" states:
Private ownership is recognized and guaranteed by laws which prescribe
the manner in which it may be acquired and enjoyed and its limitations,

with the object of ensuring its social function and of rendering it accessible
to all.15
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, Article 42(2) expressly validates the
"social function" of property ownership as an intrinsic limitation on
private dominion.
In consequence, the wave model reinforces many of the political
and social constraints that its theorists believe should cabin proprietor
entitlements. Chief among them is the subordination of proprietor
entitlements to communitarian values in those instances in which pri
vate enjoyment of the property in question is deemed offensive to
these societal values.16
This starting point implies a variety of corollaries. The wealth and
autonomy expectations of individual proprietors receive less solicitude
under the wave model, which supports more ample scope for govern
ment's police power and a less generous takings calculus for severe
intrusions on proprietary values. The model is likewise distrustful of
private ordering and the marketplace when competing public values
are at stake. Wave theorists do not assume that individual private
choice or the aggregation of wealth- or autonomy-biased preferences
will honor these values. They believe instead that the public interest
in such cases will more likely be vindicated by a public participatory
process in which the perspectives not only of proprietors, but of other
groups with a stake in the impacted community values, are taken into
account.17

14. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1688 {1988).
15. See Costituzione [CONSTITUTION][ITALY] art. 42{2) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic ofProperty,
9 CONST. COMMENTARY 259 {1992).
17. The work of Joseph Singer, starting from Hohfeld's insights, in viewing property as
social relations, is prominent here. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 751 (1988).
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Necessarily, therefore, wave theorists must subscribe (or, at least,
claim to subscribe) to a view of public process and government over
sight demanding a level of optimism that photon theorists are inclined
to view as naive, inefficient, or worse. For example, in establishing a
property-limiting regime, government must have the capability to
identify values that truly are communitarian, rather than simple ag
gregations of the preferences of elites and other groups eager to ma
nipulate the political process for private ends. It must formulate stan
dards and procedures that are accurately targeted to the program's
needs, parsimonious of private or public resources, and immune to
capture by these factions. Finally, it must at least acknowledge prop
erty's root entitlements, however more malleably defined under the
wave model. Otherwise, the program may not withstand legal chal
lenge. Even if it does, it may prove unworkable as a practical matter
in those instances in which private initiative and private dominion are
essential ingredients for the program's success.
The differences between the photon and wave models of property
and the efforts of the models' respective champions to extol the vir
tues of one over the other have largely defined the battleground for
property scholars over the last half century, if not before. There have
been occasional forays seeking to bridge the gap both in theory and in
practice between the two models. As one who has shattered lances in
assaults on this windmill,18 I have become increasingly doubtful that,
on the theoretical level at least, accommodation can be achieved. In
their opposition, the legal and more important economic and political
starting points of the two approaches rise to a level as contentious as
the beliefs of warring religious cults.
Yet life goes on, takings jurisprudence shifts but marginally toward
one or the other model (and sometimes both simultaneously), and the
nation's political economy retains its centrist cast. The reasons for this
tense but undeniable equilibrium are undoubtedly many and complex,
but helpful clues to important dimensions of the apparent paradox can
be found in Professor Joseph L. Sax's Playing Darts with a Rembrandt:

Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures.19
On its face, Playing Darts seems an unlikely venue for these clues,
and Professor Sax an unlikely author to reveal them. Playing Darts
seeks to make the case for an Italianate "social function" in privately
owned property imbued with cultural significance. It de-sacrilizes
property ownership by demoting it to "just a fact," asking "what con
sequences should follow from such facts, where there is some signifi
cant public stake on the other side," and responding with a thesis

18. See John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti
dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975).
19. Joseph L. Sax is a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley.
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calling for "recognition of a species of qualified ownership founded on
the recognition that some objects ... are constituent of a community,
and that ordinary private dominion over them insufficiently accounts
for the community's rightful stake in them" (pp.36, 37, 197).
More broadly, Playing Darts is but the latest installment of a dis
tinguished and prolific body of scholarship extending over more than
four decades in which Professor Sax has established himself as the na
tion's most thoughtful and articulate property-as-wave theorist.20 One
might anticipate that Playing Darts would present a scorching indict
ment of the property-as-photon model because the latter embraces the
"conventional notions of ownership" which Sax condemns as offensive
to the community's cultural heritage (p.9).
Paradoxically, this reader left Playing Darts with greater respect
for private dominion. Under Sax's own account, private ownership
and private ordering prove so essential to the creation and preserva
tion of this heritage that the actual reforms Sax proposes are far
milder than dogmatic commitment to this "qualified property" thesis
would suggest.
Playing Darts also engages Sax's view of the entitlement of the
community and its chroniclers to access information embedded in
heritage artifacts and sites - his version of the public's right to know
about and participate in its cultural heritage. Sax reasons as though
this view were an integral element of his private dominion inquiry.
Partially, it is an integral element when private dominion, as conven
tionally understood, impedes the community's access or preservation
interests. It is also an integral element in Sax's responding proposal of
shifting dominion entitlements to government to secure these inter
ests.
But conflating the two issues is misplaced in two contexts, the dis
cussion of which consumes a substantial portion of the volume. The
first embraces such cultural resources as archeological sites that are
originally owned by public agencies, not private individuals. Sax's dis
cussion of these resources targets the extent to which governmental
schemes allocating public access to them respect the public's right to
know (pp. 153-96).
The second embodies privately owned cultural resources - princi
pally the papers of notable governmental and private figures - that
either devolve to private sector successors or are donated to museums,
libraries, and similar public depositories. Sax's target, again, is not
private owner entitlements - which, in fact, he leaves essentially un-

20. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire
and the Origins ofan Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142 {1990); Joseph L. Sax, The Legitimacy of
Collective Values: The Case of the Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 537 {1985); Joseph L.
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 {1971); Joseph L. Sax,
Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 {1964) [hereinafter Sax, Taking].
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disturbed - but the practices or professional codes of recipient mu
seums, libraries, and executors or successors that frustrate the public's
right to know.21
Sax's conflation of these issues is problematic because his treat
ment of the public's right to know supports two conclusions that run
counter to his generally unsympathetic view of private dominion. The
first, which appears in examples where dominion is publicly held, is
that government may be no more protective of public access than may
private owners. The second, which is reflected in instances when pri
vate dominion remains undisturbed, is that private dominion may ei
ther be preferable to public control, particularly when privacy values
are at stake, or it may be the sole practical alternative, however
threatening to public values.
Photon theorists would applaud both conclusions.

II.

PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT

Playing Darts commences with Sax's statement of the problem:
"[m]any of the greatest artifacts of our civilization can be owned by
anyone who has the money to buy them, or the luck to find them, and
their owners can then treat the objects however their fancy or their
eccentricity dictates" (p. 1). Hence the volume's arresting title. The
category of artifacts selected for discussion in the succeeding chapters
includes paintings and other exemplars of fine art; architecture; the
papers of American presidents, of United States Supreme Court jus
tices, and of artists, writers and other private notables; and objects of
paleontological or archeological distinction.
Sax's examples are as provocative and culturally informed as they
are apt. They horrify, intrigue, educate, and, for many readers un
doubtedly, persuade. The balance of this Part utilizes selected exam
ples to recount the book's property rights and right-to-know themes,
stopping here and there to quibble or to lay a basis for the apprecia
tion of Playing Darts offered in the essay's final section.
A.

Fine Art

A Diego Rivera mural for the Rockefeller Center's RCA Building
serves to test the issue whether patrons may be precluded from de
stroying or altering art that they own or have commissioned. The
Rockefellers elected to raze the mural, which embarrassed them with
its likeness of Lenin and celebration of communist themes. Sax agrees

21. Sax devotes Chapters Five through Nine to these subjects. See pp. 60-150. An ex
ample of such a professional code is ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARY,
STANDARDS FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR RARE BOOK, MANUSCRIPT, AND SPECIAL
COLLECTIONS LIBRARIANS {2d ed. 1994). See p. 120.
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with those who deemed the razing an act of cultural vandalism (p. 18),
and proposes a legal regime in which the public's interest in the pres
ervation of fine art should override its patron's entitlement to destroy
or alter it (pp. 21-34).
He comments favorably on a California statute22 that rearranges
property entitlements in this manner by going beyond the artist's droit
moral, first, to locate a distinguishable preservation interest in the
public, and second, to obligate the disenchanted owner to provide the
artist or public prior notice so that the work of art can be removed and
protected. Chicago's Daley Plaza Picasso sculpture and Manhattan's
Richard Serra Tilted Arc are featured in a related discussion in which
Sax opposes artists' claims that their works must be retained indefi
nitely in the outdoor setting for which they were commissioned de
spite the public's opposition to these works (pp. 26-32).
A Graham Sutherland portrait of Winston Churchill, commis
sioned by Parliament as a gift to the aging Prime Minister, and
Georges Rouault's torching of 315 of his own incomplete paintings are
among the examples employed by Sax to explore whether private do
minion should be diminished to prevent owner/subjects like Churchill
or self-critical artists like Rouault from concealing or destroying fine
art (pp. 37-42, 43). Churchill and his wife detested the painting, which
they never displayed in his lifetime and which she burned before his
death. Rouault destroyed his own works because he feared he would
be unable to complete them to his satisfaction.
Sax would rearrange property rights in the Churchill situation,
aligning them to withdraw the owner-subject's entitlement to deny
public access to or destroy the painting. In Sax's calculus, the fact that
Churchill was both owner and subject while Rockefeller, in the previ
ous example, was owner alone does not outweigh the public's preser
vation interest. He would allow disgruntled patron/subjects (and, in
the Churchill example, spouses of patrons as well) to embargo the
painting during their lifetimes, but require public display of the pre
served painting at some non-remote period following the subject's
death (p. 41).
Sax approves Rouault's action, asserting that the entitlement of a
creator "to implement his own judgment about what is worthy of him"
outweighs the evident value of the destroyed material to the public
and to the historians and critics who broker the public's right to know
(p. 42). I am puzzled by Sax's line drawing. So long as artists are free
to display what they regard as their best work, why should not what
they regard as their lesser work also be subject to Sax's cultural heri
tage claim in view of its undeniable value in enhancing public under
standing of the work they prize? The "lesser" work, moreover, may

22. California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CrvIL CODE § 987 (West 1999).
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be received as the "greater" by present or future audiences since, as
Sax constantly reminds us, the judgment of history is often at odds
with that of self-interested parties (p. 201). Tolstoy, for example, con
demned his prior writing as worthless following his spiritual transfor
mation. Should he have been free to destroy the manuscript of War
and Peace if it had been written, but not published, prior to this expe
rience?
B.

Architecture

Controversies triggered by proposed additions to Louis Kahn's
Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, and McKim, Meade and White's
Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan are featured in Sax's treatment
of great architecture. In the preservationists' view, a new building
proposed for the Salk complex, which did not enjoy protected land
mark status, ought to have been distanced from the complex rather
than integrated into it. In Manhattan, the 55-story modern office
tower proposed by Marcel Breuer as an addition atop the Beaux Arts
Grand Central Terminal was dismissed as an "aesthetic joke" by the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (p. 56). The
Salk addition was built. But New York City's denial of a permit for
the Breuer tower resulted in the United States Supreme Court opin
ion, Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York.23
The architecture chapter differs from those preceding it because
Sax's thesis favoring qualified ownership for cultural heritage property
is well-established in the landmark/urban design field, albeit more re
cently for non-landmarked structures than for those subject to such
regimes. Its novelty for this reviewer is Sax's effort to address the
"seeming paradox" that, "unlike an ordinary owner of an ordinary
building, [the landmark owner] bears a special burden as his reward
for having endowed us with a magnificent structure" (p. 55).
The paradox was the centerpiece of Justice Rehnquist's dissent to
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Penn Central sustaining the
city's uncompensated ban of the Terminal tower. Sax criticizes Justice
Brennan's reasoning for its question-begging merger of landmark
regulation with more conventional forms of land use regulation (p.
57). A restriction from which particular property owners suffer under
the latter is premised either on a harm the restriction seeks to prevent
or some benefit deriving from the restriction and mutually enjoyed by
this and other owners impacted by the restriction. But neither condi
tion would apply to a tower-topped Grand Central Terminal. Its im
pact on its environs would be no more or less harmful than that of
fully developed properties nearby. Under the landmark ban, moreo-

23. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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ver, Penn Central was not itself the beneficiary of restrictions applying
to other properties and itself as members of a regulated class. Instead,
Penn Central had been singled out to provide a community benefit at
enormous cost to itself, a result that clashes with the harm/benefit ra
tionale.
Sax, one would think, should have little trouble with Justice
Brennan's reasoning. It fits effortlessly with Playing Darts' thesis that
owners of cultural heritage property are stewards whose dominion is
limited by conditions safeguarding the property's heritage values. The
plight of being singled out for burdens on dominion is shared, after all,
by owners of every legally constrained category of cultural property
reviewed in Playing Darts, all of whom confer an unreciprocated bene
fit on the community by bearing these burdens.
Even more to the point, Sax advocated rejection of the
harm/benefit rule in a 1964 article24 that Justice Brennan expressly
cited in support of his rejection of the rule.25 Surprisingly, Sax feels it
necessary to go further, settling the landmark owner's duty on the
"impact on others generated by an individual's choice to engage crea

tors and to take dominion over potent cultural icons ..."

(p. 58; empha
sis added). But why the need to go beyond the phrase "impact on
others," which is more than adequate to satisfy Sax's qualified prop
erty thesis? The italicized language strikes me as rubbing salt into the
dominion wound by turning the owner's choice against himself - as
suming, indeed, that it were possible for owners to know that the
buildings they are commissioning or purchasing will eventually be
designated as landmarks.
C.

Collectors' Duties

Collectors of fine paintings, sculptures, and other cultural artifacts,
Sax observes, usually treasure their art and maintain it in excellent
condition (p. 64). Many see themselves as stewards, self-obligated to
protect the art and even to loan it out for public viewing from time to
time. Were all collectors similarly inclined, Sax would eschew a for
mal legal regime mandating periodic display of their master works.
Not all collectors, however, are so inclined.
Take the case of the bizarre Albert Barnes and his collection of
2,000 of the greatest French post-Beaux Arts paintings (including the
finest collection of Renoir works anywhere). The outrage and hostil
ity greeting the 1920s display at another museum of 94 of his then
avant garde paintings so soured him on the orthodox art establishment
that he thereafter embargoed access of a group so large that it in-

24. See Sax, Taking, supra note 20, at 48-50.
25. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
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eluded "all persons whose education and work could have [given
them] serious reasons for wishing to visit it."26
With the Barnes story in mind, Sax proposes obligating collectors
to participate in an expense-compensated loan program in which their
collections are periodically displayed for public view. Selection of the
master works would be made by a committee of experts under the
auspices of the National Gallery of Art or a similar institution. Once
listed, the work would be subject to obligatory display at an appropri
ate national venue for a limited duration once or twice per generation.
The national museum would be charged with all costs and responsibili
ties associated with the loan (p. 67).
Whether coherent, confinable standards can be defined for the
broad range of cultural properties Playing Darts canvasses is highly
doubtful. These doubts contribute to my belief that, independently of
proprietary issues, control over many categories of these properties is
best relegated to private ordering. Perhaps an exception is appropri
ate for fine paintings and sculptures because many that are cherished
by the public are relatively easy to identify. But I would caution
against the exception absent tight criteria strictly limiting selection on
the basis of the number of entries, their minimum age, resource cate
gory, and of other conditions insuring appropriate citizen input and
the qualifications of the selection panel. These criteria are obviously
crude and underinclusive; many contemporary paintings and sculp
tures, for example, would be worthy of inscription as would works un
known to the public at large. Enlarging the class, however, creates an
unacceptable risk of losing control of the process, which would likely
kill adoption of the process in the first place. I would also be fearful
that disturbing private ownership and its autonomy entitlements in
this fashion might unsettle the current private ordering system, which,
with all its warts, has been reasonably effective both in securing the
display of privately owned works and in eventually shifting ownership
of many of the best works to the museums themselves.
D. Paper Trails
Playing Darts' chapters that address the papers of American presi
dents (ch. 6) and Supreme Court justices (ch. 7), and the control of the
papers and other materials of notable private figures by heirs, biogra
phers and scholars (ch. 9), merit joint treatment. Of the three classes
of property, Sax would rearrange dominion entitlements only over
presidential papers, as Congress did in 1978 when it shifted ownership

26. Pp. 74-75. Here Sax quotes Pierre Cabanne.
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of the papers after the Nixon presidency from the incumbent to the
federal government.27
Even photon theorists, I believe, would support this shift in view of
the undeniably public nature of the resource and the limited and iden
tifiable membership of the regulated class. Surely, something is wrong
when incumbent presidents must apply to the libraries of their prede
cessors to obtain crucial documents linked to ongoing matters of state,
as President Ford was obliged to do in seeking a record of the negotia
tions conducted by President Nixon with Chinese leaders. Grating, as
well, is the contrast Sax portrays between the public stewardship that
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman displayed and the contrary
stance of Richard Nixon's representatives in demanding tens of mil
lions of dollars as compensation for a congressional directive that
shifted control of his papers to the General Services Administration
(pp. 84-88).
Sax finds no truly satisfactory resolution of the clash between pub
lic disclosure and institutional or personal prerogatives regarding the
other two classes of papers. Frustration dogs his thoughtful effort to
balance the public's right to know with insulation of the Supreme
Court's internal processes from improper public disclosure. The jus
tices themselves are unable to define a common position acknowl
edging the historical value of their papers (p. 201). Some justices,
Hugo Black among them, condemn any disclosure, while others, in
cluding Thurgood Marshall, openly court it. Congress and Sax both
decline to shackle the justices with formal rules akin to those of the
Presidential Records Act transferring the papers' dominion to public
depositories (p. 116). Because there is no even playing field for schol
ars and journalists, a favored few prosper while the others languish,
and the public is kept waiting for biographies and other studies that
appear decades later if, indeed, they appear at all.
Similarly troubled is the picture regarding access to the papers of
private figures, but here, Sax tells us, the value impeding the public's
right to know shifts from protecting confidentiality of institutional
processes to safeguarding the privacy and sensitivities of these figures
or their families. Although Sax states that "the claims of history out
weigh those of family feeling," he ultimately declines to propose
shifting dominion from the papers' custodians to the public (p. 198).
He proposes instead that families and executors commit to an ethic
subordinating protection of the family hearth and its confidences to
service as stewards of a cultural resource (pp. 138-42, 198).

27. See PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT, 44 U.S.C.A. § 2203 (1996) ("[T)he President
shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, deci
sions, and policies that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other offi
cial or ceremonial duties are . . . maintained . . . pursuant to the requirements of this sec
tion . . . . ).
"
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But Sax is adamant that "[w]hatever sensitivity is appropriate to
accommodate family feeling needs first to be separated from impera
tives uttered in the name of proprietary rights" (p. 198). I would sub
mit, however, that the claims of history are overridden not simply out
of deference to family sensitivities, as Sax ultimately concludes, but
because a formal legal rule favoring history's claims over private do
minion is simply not an option given the inherent nature of the prop
erty in question.
Unlike land, which is visible, inventoried in government registries,
and the subject of public scrutiny through all manner of regulatory
limits on its use, private papers typically are shielded from public view,
uninventoried and uninventoriable, and free of regulation in no small
part because of both characteristics. Ownership of these papers,
moreover, is widely diffused throughout society. Since owner self
registration of these papers is not a realistic option, how would gov
ernment begin to get a handle on where these papers are, who owns
them, and what they contain? Even if it could, would the intrusiveness
of the requisite effort be acceptable in a free society?
A related question suggesting that proprietary rights may not be so
easily discounted is whether what Sax terms the family's "privacy" in
terest is not actually rooted in private property's autonomy value. Re
call Sax's own definition of autonomy as a "claim of entitlement to
decide the fate of an object" (p. 9). This, of course, is precisely the
claim that these papers' owners are asserting and that, under the "pri
vacy" label, Sax finds persuasive. Relevant as well (but deferred for
later discussion) is the non-property problem associated with the im
possibility in the private papers context of defining standards of cul
tural and historic value with sufficient clarity to exclude virtually any
thing that this or that elite views as exhibiting this value. One or more
of the foregoing concerns, one can assume, accounts for Congress's
refusal to extend the protections of the Presidential Records Act be
yond the confined sphere of the papers of the nation's presidents
alone.
E. Dead Sea Scrolls, Publication Rights, and Access to Library and
Museum Collections
While issues clustered around private dominion are a principal
concern of Playing Darts, the volume devotes substantial attention to
the manner in which governments and other public entities allocate
access to culturally significant objects and sites. Exploration of this
issue occurs in the chapters addressing the Dead Sea Scrolls (ch. 10),
publication rights (ch. 11), and the practices of museums and libraries
in dealing with donor-restricted materials (ch. 8).
The controversy surrounding the Dead Sea Scrolls, one of the most
dramatic archeological discoveries in human history, presents "in its
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purest (and least attractive) form the issue of scholarly access to re
search materials," according to Sax (p. 158). And a scandalous story it
is because the Jordanian and Israeli governments, as successor
owners/custodians of this find, granted exclusive investigative rights to
the Scrolls to a research team whose administration of their charge
violated the most fundamental postulates of open scholarship. The
four decades following the find witnessed warfare over translation and
publishing rights, unconscionable delays in the Scrolls' processing and
publication, unwillingness of the team to share information beyond
other team members and their graduate students, and the delayed dis
closure of information of cardinal importance to biblical scholarship.28
Aside from chronicling the ensuing frustration of the public's right to
know, the chapter introduces the archeologists' convention known as a
"publication right," which Sax defines as "a scholarly convention
[that] gives the researcher who is assigned to publish a text complete
control over it for an indefinite period" (p. 164).
In a linked chapter entitled "The Privatization of Scholarly Re
search," Sax explores the pros and cons of the publication rights con
vention and its source in government-permitting schemes for archeo
logical sites under which the team selected for the excavation receives
the exclusive right to publish its findings (pp. 165-78). Libraries and
museums holding papyrological resources engage in similar practices
when they assign favored scholars like rights to particular documents.
Sax is troubled by this "privatization" of access because the practice is
vulnerable to the varied abuses detailed in the Dead Sea Scrolls chap
ter. To these he adds arrangements blocking the access of other
scholars to materials even after the favored scholar has published
findings concerning them (pp. 176-78).
Sax's commitment to the public's right to know reappears in his
critique of the access-denying practices of libraries and museums, par
ticularly as they derive from restrictions imposed by donors as a condi
tion of gifting their cultural artifacts to these institutions. Singled out
for intense criticism are post-publication embargoes, exclusivity ar
rangements and other filters that deny scholars and the public they
serve an even playing field, embargoes exceeding periods reasonably
designed to ensure the privacy and privilege interests of persons refer
enced in the donor's collection, and access limitations permitting ad
ministrators to pick and choose among access applicants. Sax warns
that these devices undermine the community's participation in its cul
tural heritage when placed in the hanc;ls of competing biographers,
protective relatives, curators with their own research agendas, and

28. For various accounts of the Dead Sea Scrolls history, see FRANK CROSS, THE
ANCIENT LIBRARY OF QUMRAN (3d ed. 1995); LAWRENCE H. SCHIFFMAN, RECLAIMING
THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS (1994); JAMES VANDERKAM, THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS TODAY
(1994).
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others who are disinclined "to let history make its own judgments" (p.
201). These concerns gain credibility in Sax's account of the manner
in which the family of C.G. Jung and the acolytes of Sigmund Freud
manipulated access to Library of Congress collections of the Jung and
Freud papers to prevent unflattering portrayals of both (pp. 122-23,
128-33).
Readers unfamiliar with the practices of governments, libraries,
and museums detailed in these three chapters will learn a great deal,
much of it disturbing. They will also be impressed with Sax's probing,
contextually nuanced arguments on behalf of the public's right to
know, or of letting "history make its own judgments" (p. 201) unfet
tered by the access-distorting practices he details. Moreover, these
chapters are fascinating reading. Whether exposing the academic
scandals associated with the Dead Sea Scrolls research team or the
Freud papers debacle at the Library of Congress, Sax engages the
reader with graceful writing, cultural literacy, and dramatically apt
examples.
The chapters also invite two observations adverted to earlier in this
Review. First, they demonstrate that the answer to the cultural heri
tage issues Playing Darts poses does not reduce simply to shifting do
minion entitlements from the private to the public sector. Govern
ment failure, as the Dead Sea Scrolls scandal illustrates, is no less a
problem in this field than in any other regulatory sphere. Second,
these chapters reveal how effectively property ownership's inherent
characteristics constrain the extent to which private entitlements can
be discounted in the effort to secure public access to cultural artifacts.
Sax's chapter on access to library and museum collections, for ex
ample, seethes with his abhorrence of access-distorting donor restric
tions "made under the aegis of proprietary right" (p. 121). Yet his re
form proposals slide around this right, as they do in his treatment of
private papers of culturally influential figures, and focus instead on the
adoption by institutions of a common set of rules designed to discour
age the more egregious of the donor restrictions (pp. 126, 128). Sax
understands, it seems clear, how utterly unworkable and impractical
would be an effort to collectivize cultural heritage efforts by seeking,
for example, to compel an across-the-board transfer to government of
dominion over privately owned artifacts or to deny owners the enti
tlement to impose access-restricting conditions on their voluntary
transfers.
F.

Antiquities

Playing Darts closes its inventory of cultural artifacts with a chap
ter on antiquities, defined as culturally significant objects found in or
under the soil of private sites (pp. 179-96). Demonstrating top form as
one of the nation's premier land use theoreticians, Sax probes the pri-
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vate/public dominion issue in antiquities by contrasting case studies
featuring "Sue" the Tyrannosaurus Rex (a fossil found in South Da
kota), and the Chauvet Cave, a Southwest France treasure containing
the oldest cave drawings yet found in Europe. Sax's ideal would be an
antiquities regime that protects the scientific value of the object, pre
vents destructive excavation, allows for appropriate research before
the object is removed, provides assurance that future research oppor
tunities will not be lost, and features an eminent domain valuation rule
that excludes values from compensation awards associated with the
object's cultural significance (pp. 193-94).
Sue enjoyed none of these protections because none are afforded
in the United States for fossils or any other antiquities buried in pri
vate sites. In consequence, one of the most complete and best articu
lated skeletons of its type became simply another object of commerce,
its preservation and availability for study subject to the vicissitudes of
the marketplace. Happily, the story ends well because Sotheby's auc
tioned the fossil off for $8.36 million to the Chicago Field Museum of
Natural History in an arrangement underwritten by private corpora
tions.29
The legal protections afforded the Chauvet Cave under French law
are closer to Sax's ideal. France does not claim state ownership of an
tiquities and must compensate owners for their acquisition. But it ef
fectively shifts the value of these antiquities to the state by granting
owners excavation permits only on terms fixed by the state. Under its
legislation, France sealed the Chauvet Cave off for preservation and
scientific investigation. It declared the cave a historic monument,
which had the effect not only of preserving the site but of burdening
the cave with a public servitude coextensive with the cave's paleon
tological significance. The French government subsequently acquired
the site outright in a condemnation proceeding that fixed compensa
tion on the basis of the acquired property's current use rather than on
the basis of the vastly inflated values attributable to the cave's cultural
status or the tourist income it could be expected to generate (pp. 186-

93).
Similar antiquities protection regimes for private sites could be es
tablished as police power measures in this nation, I believe, without
running afoul of existing Fifth Amendment constraints, provided that
the residual value of the site, as measured by its current or permitted
uses, would not be severely diminished. Penn Central, for example,
concluded that the tower ban imposed on the Grand Central Terminal
was not a taking even though the tower's value was capitalized in the
$57 million dollar range. But the Supreme Court ignored this huge
opportunity cost in favor of a finding that the landmark restriction left

29. See Malcolm W. Browne, Tyrannosaur Skeleton ls Sold To
Million, N.Y. nMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at Sec.l p.37.
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undisturbed the income potential the property enjoyed in its current
as a railroad terminal incorporating supplemental commercial ac
tivities.30
Less clear is whether or not the Fifth Amendment would counte
nance eminent domain awards that exclude values associated with the
site's cultural significance, as occurred in the Chauvet Cave example.
In the United States, these awards are premised principally on the
property's so-called highest and best use, a measure that, depending
on the situation at hand, might be deemed to include values associated
with the site's cultural stature.31 Professor Sax implicitly resolves this
issue earlier in his volume when he rejects the claim that government
ought to rely upon its eminent domain power to achieve the volume's
proposed cultural heritage goals. His response:

use

[t]he issues raised in the following pages, however, are intended to pose a
prior question: what powers and responsibilities should be recognized in
the owners of such objects in the first instance? . . Such issues are not
resolved by recognition of the government's power to expropriate such
interests if they exist. They are questions about the relation that ought to
exist between certain things that are physically capable of exclusive own
ership and control and the larger community's claim upon them. [p. 9;
first emphasis added]
.

If the courts were to agree with Sax that "in the first instance," owners
of antiquity-laden sites are burdened by a public servitude, there
would be no need for government to compensate owners for these
values because it would be purchasing something that it already owns
as trustee for the community.
III.

PLAYING DARTS:

AN APPRECIATION

Three decades ago, Professor Sax sought to enlarge protection of
the natural environment by premising citizen lawsuits on the thesis
that, as fiduciary of a public trust, government was legally obligated to
administer its property on behalf of the public, the beneficiary of this
trust.32 Today, his vision has broadened to encompass the cultural en
vironment and the private sector with the more sweeping thesis that
private owners of culturally significant resources should be obligated
to administer their property as stewards or custodians of the public
interest.
Sax extols a model of the private property owner as "the responsi
ble collector who does not destroy and who does not conceal his
treasures"; and as one of a group of like individuals who are "only
30. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
31. See Costonis, supra note 18, at 1038-45.
32 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471 (1970).
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temporary custodians"; and who "see themselves as the bearers of
some special responsibility that transcends indulgence of their own
fancies" (p. 201). What Sax declares of owners of great architecture
- they are "not just owners, but custodians"33 - he holds for owners
of all classes of culturally significant property. This construct, Sax ob
serves, "remains the law's awkward little secret" (p. 59). His volume
strives not only to disclose the secret, but to secure its recognition as a
legal principle as influential for private dominion as his public trust
thesis has been for public dominion.
His private stewardship claim is as much reflective of the direction
in which the law may actually be developing as it is advocacy of a
novel point of view, an observation that applies as well to his earlier
public trust thesis. Playing Darts, in fact, understates this develop
ment in its claim that "the dominant modern idea of ownership is un
derstood as entitlement to possess an object as an exclusively private
thing, devoid of any public element except a broad obligation to avoid
doing conventional harm such as trespassing on the territory of oth
ers" (p. 3). In truth, the public dimension of private ownership
throughout the last half-century has been magnified well beyond this
photon-like characterization. The point is quickly confirmed by con
sulting digests of legislation or decisions in the fields of historic pres
ervation and urban design, endangered species protection, and, more
broadly, the entire body of environmental law as it has developed
since the late 1960s.
The conceptual thorn pressing against Sax's thesis has been the
rule encountered in the earlier Penn Central discussion that allows
government to reduce private property entitlements to prevent harm,
but not to compel a benefit. Strictly applied, the harm/benefit rule
would overwhelm his thesis because no clearer example of a com
pelled benefit can be imagined than government's singling out owners
to share their culturally significant property with the general public.
Despite its intuitive appeal and earlier influence, the rule has been
weakened by assaults in the literature, including Sax's own work,34 and
its uncertain standing in the courts, as evidenced by Penn Central it
self.35 We can be certain that the rule is in trouble when even Justice
Scalia, the high priest of photon theory,36 joins in trashing it.37

33. P. 59. (citing Herbert Muschamp, Critic's Notebook: Art and Science Politely Dis
agree on an Architectural Jewel's Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at Cll).
34. See Sax, Taking, supra note 20, at 48-50; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Util
ity, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-201 (1967).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
36. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Scalia, J.);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Scalia, J.).
37. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-26.
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Although conceptually distinct from his private trust reasoning,
Sax's argument favoring the public's right to know about and partici
pate in its cultural heritage will also facilitate his thesis's acceptance.
The argument taps into a powerful trend dating back to the "citizen
participation" movement, which developed as a backlash to abuses of
urban renewal programs a half-century ago. Over the last thirty years
of environmentalism, this movement, aided by Sax's generalship, has
witnessed the emergence of public interest organizations as a potent
force in public policymaking of federal and state environmental im
pact requirements, and of legislation empowering citizens to challenge
government-sanctioned development proposals in administrative and
judicial proceedings. Cultural heritage values, with historic preserva
tion at the prow, have been a major beneficiary of these innovations.
Then, of course, there is Playing Darts' emotional appeal. Who,
but a Visigoth, or perhaps a law and economics or public choice cult
ist, could possibly oppose a thesis that promises safe haven not only
for the various cultural gems noted earlier but, to select randomly
from Sax's fecund inventory, Da Vinci's Codex Hammer; Renoir's Au
Moulin de la Galette; Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim Museum;
Stonehenge; Homo Erectus (Java Man); an undisclosed notebook of
T.S. Eliot's poems; a manuscript of D.H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers;
and the papers of Franz Kafka, FDR, Sylvia Plath, James Joyce, and
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter?
A brilliant theorist, Sax is also passionate in his beliefs and very,
very shrewd in his advocacy. He understands that his thesis will not
carry unless he can convince us, first, that there truly is a "community"
out there united by consensus values and, second, that standards of
cultural significance for varied categories of privately owned cultural
property can be defined that are accurate, confinable, and, what may
be the same thing, administrable. How better to create the impression
that neither claim is problematic than to scour the last 30,000 years of
human history and prehistory for properties that have become indis
putable icons of West European and American culture?
Although Sax's argument is likely to enjoy significant legal, politi
cal, and emotional support, I expect that its success will nonetheless be
mixed. The obstacles to its practical implementation are obscured by
the simplicity of the theoretical construct on which it is premised. Cer
tain of these obstacles go beyond administrative complications,
moreover, and contest the construct's de-sacrilization of private own
ership. In tiptoeing past them, Sax reasons as if the cogency of the
theoretical construct is unrelated to its capacity for implementation,
and vice-versa.
My sense that Playing Darts promises more than it can deliver is
sharpened by the evident disparity between the boldness of its thesis
and the modesty of its proposed reforms. So wide is the gap that I am
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led to wonder if Sax's modesty reflects his own silent discounting of
his bold thesis in anticipation of these obstacles.
Playing Darts' two chapters dealing with the Dead Sea Scrolls (ch.
10) and publication rights (ch. 11) are not truly relevant to his private
property thesis because they target government's allocation of access
to property it owns or controls. To like effect is Playing Darts' treat
ment of the papers of Supreme Court justices; access to library and
museum collections; and heirs, biographers, and scholars (pp. 93-133).
These chapters do engage property that is, or once was, in private
ownership, but Sax never challenges this ownership. He neither com
pels private owners to preserve and to provide access to their treasures
(as he does owners of fine art) nor deprives private donors of the enti
tlement to condition access to their collections in any (constitutional)
manner they please. His choices are the less intrusive, if quite admi
rable ones, of urging owners to manage their property pursuant to an
ethic of stewardship, and urging museums and libraries to join collec
tively in accords that discourage donors from imposing access limita
tions on their gifts of private property.
Sax's two chapters on the preservation of great architecture (ch. 4)
and presidential papers (ch. 6) make object lessons of legal develop
ments that have already matured, rather than pursue novel directions.
Historic preservation has been a familiar planning tool since the 1930s,
even if the Supreme Court did not get around to its validation until
1978. The regulation of distingliished, but non-landmarked gems is a
later development, but the land use codes of cities sophisticated in the
urban design arts routinely address these properties as well. Post
Nixon Presidential papers have been in public ownership since 1978,
when Congress adopted the Presidential Records Act.
The chapters on fine art (chs. 1-5) and antiquities (ch. 12), on the
other hand, do call for a rearrangement of property rights. The for
mer withdraws from owners the rights to destroy or mutilate fine art
(pp. 13-34) and to deny access to it (pp. 60-80); the latter withdraws
the right to destructive excavation and denial of access to the antiq
uity, and, in cases of eminent domain, to a valuation rule that includes
monetary values linked to the object's cultural significance (pp. 17996).
But even in these instances, Sax treads on private dominion as
lightly as possible. Murals may be removed, provided their artists are
given prior notice and the opportunity to remove them (pp. 32-34).
Portraits need not be shown during the lifetime of their (offended)
subjects and for a reasonable time thereafter, provided that they are
made available for periodic public viewing after this time (p. 41).
Obligatory loans of fine art to public institutions should be employed
only as "a matter of last resort," at no expense, and with as little in
convenience as possible to their collectors (p. 67). Owners of land
containing antiquities or discoverers of the latter should receive a
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"substantial reward" and the former should be allowed to sell the an
tiquity if its sale does not imperil the public's interest in the "ideas,
information, or inspiration embodied within" it (p. 195).
Why does Sax apply his "qualified property" thesis in such muted
fashion? I would propose three reasons. First, Playing Darts pursues
multiple targets, only one of which seeks the immediate reformulation
of private property rights, and the attention of the foregoing chapters
is distributed among these targets. Second, an unfortunate conse
quence of Sax's decision "not . . . to enunciate a set of rules, but rather
to draw attention to issues . . . and to illustrate the common themes
they display" is the diversion of his attention from the implementation
obstacles adverted to above (p. 197). Finally, too aggressive an effort
by Sax to de-sacrilize property, as his thesis seems to demand, would
prove both infeasible and counterproductive.
Commencing with the first of these reasons, Sax adds to his prop
erty rights concerns the formulation of a pre-legal ethic of reverence
for the cultural environment and an assault on the varied impediments
to community access to and participation in this environment. With
respect to the former, Sax seeks to do for the cultural environment
what Aldo Leopold attempted for the natural environment when, in A
Sand County Almanac, he preached a land ethic.38 Sax, an evangelist
no less than a lawyer, understands that ideas do have consequences,
one of the most potent of which is to prepare the ground for their
eventual passage from ethical to legal stature. It is Playing Darts'
strength, not its weakness, that it seeks to inculcate this ethic into what
are largely private ordering arrangements at the present time. Sax's
hope, one suspects, is that this ethic, like Leopold's land ethic, will
progressively bleed into the legislation and constitutional jurispru
dence of a later day. This Review's earlier discussion of Sax's com
mitment to the public's right to know - the latter of his additions reveals not only the depth of his passion for this value but the exten
sive treatment that it receives throughout Playing Darts.
Moving to the second reason, Sax's theoretical focus causes him to
avoid, rather than confront, the genuine difficulties posed by his
premises regarding "community" values and coherent and confinable
standards of cultural significance. Not surprisingly, these are the very
premises, along with Sax's diminution of private dominion, that will
most rile photon theorists. But even those who, like myself, place
themselves toward the center of the wave/photon spectrum have rea
son to be disappointed with the manner in which Sax's silence has the
unseemly effect of stacking the deck to his advantage.
Playing Darts's world often appears to be one in which every
painting is a Rembrandt, every fossil Homo Erectus, and every author
38. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1966).
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James Joyce. If that were so, validating community values or defining
standards of cultural significance would be simple tasks. Indeed, se
lecting icons satisfying both requirements is simple if the selection is
done ex post from an inventory dating back to prehistory and compre
hending every cultural artifact imaginable.
But that's not how the process would work with respect to many, if
not most, of the categories of cultural property named in Playing
Darts. Determinations of cultural significance would more often have
to be made ex ante, long before the object has ripened into an icon or
its creator into an artist or architect enjoying consensus status as a
master among the elite or the general public. To take only one exam
ple of a figure whose paintings or private papers would likely be cul
tural artifacts for Playing Darts' purposes, Renoir was unacceptable to
the Beaux Arts establishment during his lifetime and for an indeter
minate period thereafter. Witness the reaction to Albert Barnes's
1923 exhibition at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts.39
Sax's confidence that governmental processes can enable "history
[to] make its own judgments," thereby curing the shortsightedness and
bias of the cultural property's "mere proprietors," borders on the
grandiose (p. 201). In fact, it is Sax himself who observes that a "pri
mary value" of the private collector "is the very presence of individual
and eccentric, often advanced, tastes that would never be reflected in
(indeed is all too often rejected by) official canons of selection or pro
priety," (p. 60; emphasis added) and who inquires "why should one

expect any special wisdom from a city council or any other collection
of public worthies?" (p. 52). Why indeed? Despite the foregoing quo
tations, a recurring problem with Playing Darts is its inclination to ad
vance its case by confusing governmental chambers with the salon of
Gertrude Stein and public administrators and community activists
with her erudite habitues. My experience with the kind of public over
sight Sax envisages is that however useful as a ritual for community
venting, it affords scant assurance that the judgment of history will
either be divined or respected. Not infrequently, what occurs instead
is the creation of spurious history, as evidenced by adobe shopping
centers in Santa Fe or the designation of the most banal or architec
turally scrambled of neighborhoods as "historic" districts.
The "community" to which Sax appeals may be solidly behind the
preservation of Leonardo DaVinci's Codex Hammer or Freud's pa
pers. But what about the works of history's countless scientists, artists,
and authors of lesser import that are more likely to be the subject of
the public processes he advocates. It must also be admitted that these
"communities" are often simply cultural elites who, like the architec
tural critics who opposed the Salk Institute addition, align themselves

39. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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with heritage activists and purport to speak for the public. Let us ac
cept that mandarins' voices should be regarded as proxy for the vox
populi, at least when the actual public is acquiescent or indifferent, or
in those rare cases when the cultural artifact in issue is indisputably an
icon. Who speaks for the "community," however, if a cultural re
source divides various groups as occurs, for example, when the in
flated values associated with a neighborhood's historic district desig
nation drive out its low-income population?40
My objection is not that Sax fails to answer these questions persua
sively, but that he avoids addressing them at all. As a result, we lose
the benefit of the contributions he might offer toward their resolution.
In addition, his silence leads him to overstate the extent to which
"[c]onventional notions of ownership and dominion" impede cultural
preservation (p. 197).
Entitlement allocations certainly do enter into the picture. But
they are by no means the whole story. Even if they were as malleable
as Sax would like - and Penn Central suggests substantial movement
in this direction - wholesale regulation of a number of the categories
of privately owned property discussed in Playing Darts would likely
not be preferable to the current private ordering alternative as long as
these questions remain open. My exceptions would be architecture,
antiquities, and perhaps, obligatory loans of fine art. Although not
without standard-setting issues of their own, these categories may be
more amenable than other types of cultural property to public permit
ting regimes featuring acceptably coherent and precise standards.
The final reason for the shortfall between Sax's ambitious thesis
and quite modest proposals for reform returns us to this Review's in
troductory claim. Playing Darts may help us to understand why tak
ings jurisprudence and property regimes move within very narrow
margins despite the theoretical chasm dividing wave and photon prop
erty theorists. Paradoxically, Sax's effort to dispense with private do
minion as a constraint on cultural preservation ends up demonstrating
not only that private entitlements are indispensable to preservation's
success, but that disregarding their pervasive presence is both infeasi
ble and counterproductive.
Let us use Playing Darts as our text for the homily. Sax opens the
volume by acknowledging that "[f]or the most part it is neither practi
cal nor appropriate that [cultural heritage objects] be publicly owned"
(p. 9). Subsequently, he cites various grounds for the proposition that
40. Virtually the only point at which Sax expressly addresses the issues of "community"
raised in the text is in Chapter I, note 4, where he discusses the "Kennewick Man," an an
cient human skeleton of a Native American, that Native Americans wish to bury and scien
tists wish to study. Sax disclaims that it is his intent to "suggest there is a single, monolithic
community." P. 203. But his claim is belied by his subsequent practice of identifying the
values of the "community" with those he himself intuits as most in keeping with the goal of
securing cultural heritage protection.
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the private collector "is crucial to the protection" of these objects (p.
60).
Cultural innovation is one ground. A "primary value" of private
participation, Sax comments, "is the very presence of individual and
eccentric, often advanced, tastes that would never be reflected in (in
deed is all too often rejected by) official canons of selection or propri
ety" (p. 60). The "stewardship tradition" nurtured by private collec
tors is a second ground (p. 72). It receives Sax's praise as "obviously
powerful and deeply rooted . . . impressively it grows out of self
imposed restraint, not as a duty imposed by law or even the strictures
of public opinion" (p. 72). Stocking the culture's libraries and muse
ums with great art, and its cities with great architecture is a third. In
his appreciation of private collectors, Sax stresses that "through their
philanthropy . . . many, perhaps most, of the greatest works eventually
find their way into public institutions" (p. 201). His discussion of great
architecture likewise acknowledges that owners of these gems "bear[]
a special burden as [their] reward for having endowed us with . . .
magnificent structure[s]" (p. 55).
A fourth ground is the preemptive weight Sax accords a value he
describes as "privacy," but which often seems indistinguishable from
familiar sticks in the property bundle. illustrative is his conclusion
that owners of distinctive private homes should not be compelled to
open them to public view because "privacy militates against legally
compelled openings to the public" (p. 68). William Pitt would rush to
exclaim, however, that "privacy" in this context is deeply rooted in, if
not one and the same as, the right to exclude, certainly one of the pro
prietor's most precious entitlements.41 To like effect is Sax's support
for the artist's or writer's entitlement to order the destruction of his
work, no matter how culturally momentous. At one point Sax de
scribes the value being protected as the creator's entitlement "to im
plement his own judgment about what is worthy of him" (p. 42). But
is not this value congruent with the autonomy interest in property,
which Sax himself defines elsewhere as a "claim of entitlement to de
cide the fate of an object" (p. 9)?
Deference to pro-dominion values appears in two other guises that
receive attention in earlier paragraphs of this Review. One, seen in
the discussion of private papers of notable figures, is Sax's choice in
particular contexts not to shift proprietor entitlements to government,
even though they impede or bar the public's right to participate
knowledgeably in its cultural heritage. The other is his restriction of
property rights to the minimum necessary in those instances when he
believes some rearrangement is advisable.

41. See supra note 1 1 and accompanying text.

1862

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1837

Are these pro-dominion features mere gestures advanced by a
shrewd wave theorist to minimize opposition to a radical rearrange
ment of property rights? Perhaps Sax thinks so, but I do not. I believe
that they reveal instead that property rights are not so easily secular
ized, and, if barred at the door, may nonetheless find their way back in
through the window, albeit garbed as pragmatic accommodation
rather than as constitutional command. Sax understands that if he
pushes his qualified property thesis too hard, his efforts will be coun
terproductive. Among a litany of drawbacks, collectors may cease to
collect42 or donate their treasures to museums (p. 69). Patrons may
move their art to other jurisdictions (p. 66). Finders may discontinue
their exploration for fossils or other antiquities, or vandalize these ar
tifacts (pp. 195-96).
The upshot of these observations can be summed up in alternative
ways. One, which continues the de-sacrilization of private property as
a mere "fact," is to acknowledge that this "fact" has major functional
implications that must be respected in any inquiry into how and
whether cultural property will be created, made accessible to the pub
lic, and preserved in the United States. The second is to conclude that
private property's functional importance explains why it has been sac
rilized over the course of the development of Anglo-American prop
erty and why it has been singled out for special status by the Constitu
tion's framers.
Whichever alternative is chosen, the reader leaves Playing Darts
with confidence that the theoretical gaps dividing wave and photon
property scholars will largely be filtered out in the practical conduct of
cultural preservation. All that is lacking to test the question is a com
panion volume on the topic composed by a photon scholar. Theoreti
cal rhetoric aside, how different would its basic prescriptions be from
Sax's own? Would it have any greater success discounting the evident
realities of culture and community than Sax has had in de-sacrilizing
property? Would its predisposition to private ordering not have to
yield from time to time to recognition that the collective action de
manded to achieve some forms of imperatively valuable cultural pres
ervation simply cannot be achieved without a governmental assist?
Finally, would it recognize that, despite their formal elegance, systems,
in the end, make fools uf us all?

42. See text supra following note 26 for a discussion of the related reluctance to display.

